TeamManager

Scope

• Contract: TeamManager.sol

• Version: v1

• Framework: OpenZeppelin Contracts Upgradeable v5

Executive Summary

The TeamManager contract has been audited following the implementation of standardized security patterns across the Lendefi DAO ecosystem. The contract exhibits strong security practices including a well-implemented role-based access control system, timelocked upgrades, comprehensive input validation, and secure fund management. No critical vulnerabilities were identified. The recent role assignment updates have significantly enhanced decentralization by shifting more control to the timelock controller.

Key Findings

Severity	Number of Findings
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	1
Informational	3

Risk Assessment

Role-Based Access Control ✅

The contract implements a comprehensive role-based access control system with revised role assignments:

• DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE → timelock controller

• PAUSER_ROLE → timelock controller (previously assigned to guardian)

• MANAGER_ROLE → timelock controller

• UPGRADER_ROLE → both timelock controller and multisig (expanded from multisig only)

This updated role assignment pattern improves decentralization by moving the PAUSER_ROLE from the guardian to the timelock controller, ensuring emergency functions require governance approval. Additionally, the UPGRADER_ROLE is now shared between the timelock and multisig, adding an additional layer of security while maintaining the multisig's ability to process upgrades.

Upgrade Security ✅

The contract implements the standardized timelocked upgrade pattern:

struct UpgradeRequest {
    address implementation;
    uint64 scheduledTime;
    bool exists;
}

The upgrade process follows a secure three-step workflow:

1. Schedule upgrade (requires UPGRADER_ROLE)

2. Wait for timelock period (3 days)

3. Execute upgrade with verification (requires UPGRADER_ROLE)

The contract now includes an upgrade cancellation mechanism, addressing a previous informational finding:

function cancelUpgrade() external onlyRole(UPGRADER_ROLE) {
    if (!pendingUpgrade.exists) {
        revert UpgradeNotScheduled();
    }
    address implementation = pendingUpgrade.implementation;
    delete pendingUpgrade;
    emit UpgradeCancelled(msg.sender, implementation);
}

Team Vesting Implementation ✅

The contract implements a secure team token vesting mechanism with:

• Reasonable constraints on cliff periods (90-365 days)

• Reasonable constraints on vesting durations (1-4 years)

• Prevention of duplicate beneficiaries

• Thorough supply checks before allocation

• Secure token transfers using SafeERC20

Fund Management ✅

The contract demonstrates secure fund management practices:

• Tracks total token allocations

• Validates supply constraints before allocations

• Uses SafeERC20 for token transfers

• Prevents receiving ETH with a custom error

• Enforces allocations within team's token allocation (18% of total supply)

Input Validation ✅

The contract employs robust input validation through:

• Custom modifiers (nonZeroAddress, nonZeroAmount)

• Explicit range checks for cliffs and durations

• Duplicate beneficiary verification

• Supply constraint validations

• ReentrancyGuard protection on state-changing functions

Detailed Findings

Low Severity

1. No Emergency Token Recovery Mechanism

   If tokens other than the ecosystem token are accidentally sent to the contract, there is no way to recover them.

   Recommendation: Consider adding an emergency token recovery function for non-ecosystem tokens that can only be called by the MANAGER_ROLE.

Informational

1. No Upgrade Cancellation Mechanism ✅ Resolved

   The contract now includes an cancelUpgrade() function that allows addresses with UPGRADER_ROLE to cancel scheduled upgrades, addressing this previous finding.

2. Fixed Team Allocation Percentage

   The team allocation is hardcoded to 18% of the total supply, which provides strong guarantees but lacks flexibility if governance decides to adjust this percentage.

3. Documentation Clarity

   While the contract uses NatSpec comments, some function parameter descriptions could be more detailed, especially regarding the expected units for cliff and duration parameters (seconds).

Conclusion

The TeamManager contract demonstrates excellent adherence to the standardized security patterns established for the Lendefi DAO ecosystem. The implementation of role-based access control, timelocked upgrades, secure vesting mechanics, and comprehensive input validation provides a strong security foundation.

The updated role assignments represent a significant improvement in the contract's security model by:

1. Moving PAUSER_ROLE from a single guardian to the timelock controller

2. Adding timelock controller to UPGRADER_ROLE alongside the multisig

These changes align with the ecosystem-wide shift toward greater decentralization and consistent governance through the timelock controller. Emergency operations now require governance approval rather than individual action, and upgrades benefit from both the security of the multisig and the decentralized oversight of the DAO.

The contract successfully implements all required security patterns:

1. ✅ Enhanced role management with improved decentralization

2. ✅ Timelocked upgrades with appropriate checks

3. ✅ Upgrade cancellation capability

4. ✅ Secure token management

5. ✅ Comprehensive input validation

6. ✅ Reentrancy protection

7. ✅ Version tracking for upgrades

No critical or high severity issues were identified. The minor issues noted do not compromise the security of the contract and can be addressed in future updates.